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ABSTRACT
Gonnella, Michael A. M.S.E.E., Department of Electrical Engineering, Wright State University,
2018. Chaotic Based Self-Synchronization for RF Steganography Radar/Communication Wave-
form.
In this project, we continue previous CSR project entitled RF Steganography based
Joint Radar/Communication Waveform Design to develop a bio-inspired secure low prob-
ability detection (LPD) radio frequency (RF) waveform that can serve multiple purposes
simultaneously. Previously, we have developed an RF steganography based RF waveform
to conceal a secure digital communication within a linear frequency modulated (LFM)
chirp radar signal. By exploiting novel reduced phase shift keying modulation and variable
symbol duration, the new waveform is resistant to time domain analysis, frequency domain
analysis and cyclostationary analysis. However, to demodulate the hidden communication
message, the intended receiver has to know the entire sequence of variable symbol dura-
tion, or the entire sequence of pseudo-random phases. We are developing a chaotic based
self-synchronization scheme to solve this problem and provide enhanced security. Specifi-
cally, a chaotic sequence generator is employed to generate an aperiodic chaotic sequence
to control the phase of the reduced phase shift keying modulation. The intended receiver
only needs to have knowledge of the initial condition of the chaotic sequence generator to
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Electronic warfare is an ongoing battle in the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. One party
will develop a new secure method of communications and another will immediately begin
work to defeat the implemented security measures. Once the security is defeated this allows
the other party access to the communications leading to continued development of new and
more secure methods of communication.
As early as 1900 BCE, evidence has been found showing the use of cryptography,
the creation and study of codes and techniques used to communicate securely, when non-
standard hieroglyphs were found on the walls. In one instance a formula for a pottery glaze
was hidden, protecting trade secrets. Since then the methods and techniques have evolved
through many different stages to keep up with the forms of communication being used and
the type of data being hidden. Some more recent examples are the various Axis powers
cipher machines during World War II, such as the German Enigma and the Japanese JN-25
along with the associated allied decryption efforts. [1]
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Figure 1.1: The German Enigma machine
Military use of encryption became commonplace as each side attempted to securely
transmit information as it was proven that gaining access to an adversaries movements and
strategies could turn the tide of war. Contemporary systems face these challenges more
than ever as more and more data is being transmitted wirelessly it is imperative that secure
transmissions be made.
In this project we expand upon a previous project, titled RF Steganography based Joint
Radar/Communication Waveform Design. In the previous project a secure, low probability
of detection (LPD) radio frequency (RF) waveform was designed which could be used both
as a radar waveform, as well as a communications waveform.
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One common approach to LPD waveforms uses spread-spectrum methods to distribute
a signals power across a larger frequency band such that the power spectral density of the
signal lies below the noise floor making it difficult to differentiate the signal from the noise.
Another method emulates naturally occuring waveforms, such as random noise, or animal
sounds, to hide a signal within an environment.
Figure 1.2: Spread-Spectrum Technique
In the previous project a different approach was chose - RF Steganography: the use of an
existing waveform to conceal a secondary communication within it. Previous research has
developed a novel means of embedding a communications signal onto an existing radar
waveform that is not able to be detected using more advanced forms of signal analysis,
namely cyclostationary analysis. Our goal is to improve upon this design by implement-
ing a chaotic based self-synchronization scheme. The following background chapter will





The advent of cyclostationary analysis rendered many LPD waveforms obsolete and driven
the design of this waveform, so it is helpful to discuss what it is. Cyclostationary analysis
identifies man-made waveforms by their periodic features such as amplitude, phase, and
frequency modulation. [2] By correlating a signal with itself at various offsets, we are
able to find these periodic features. Because noise has no cyclostationary features, the
autocorrelation of the noise at any time offset will be low, but the periodic features will
be exposed. This allows us to discover signal which are hidden below the noise-floor or
noise-like. [3]
Figure 2.1: Spectral Correlation Function
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2.1.1 Cyclic Autocorrelation Function
A fundamental parameter when distinguishing cyclic features from random data is the limit
cyclic autocorrelation, which is a general form of the conventional limit autocorrelation
and limit spectum.[2][4] We begin by defining the mean of an assumed complex signal
x(t) as follows: [5][6]
Mx(t, τ) = E[x(t+ τ ] (2.1)
In the equation above, τ is the lag value.
For a cyclostationary signal, the mean is independent of τ . Next we look at the auto-
correlation function (AF). Sometimes called the temporal lag product series, this is the
correlation of a signal with itself with a temporal lag, defined by the following equation:
Rx(t1, t2) = E[x(t1)x
∗(t2)] (2.2)
Rewritten with t1 = t+ τ/2, t2 = t− τ/2, t = (t1 + t2)/2, and τ = t1 − t2:













In the above equation Rαx(τ) is the cyclic autocorrelation function or CAF and α is the









Where T is the period and α = m/T .
2.1.2 Spectral Correlation Function
Next we look at the spectral correlation function (SCF). The SCF is the most used for
identifying cyclostationary features of random signals. Similar to how the power spectrum
is the spectral density of variance, the SCF is the spectral density of covariance and is






Where α is the cyclic frequency, and f is the spectrum frequency.
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2.2 Waveform Design
2.2.1 Bio-Inspired Chirp Carrier
The advent of cyclostationary analysis rendered previous LPD waveforms obsolete. While
previous LPD designs utilized techniques to suppress the power spectral density below
the ambient noise floor, cyclostationary analysis is able to detect man-made periodicities
within a signal, such as modulation, despite being below the noise floor as the noise has no
cyclostationary features [7][8]. Instead the designed waveform hides in plain sight using
what was termed RF Steganography - embedding the communications waveform on an
existing radar waveform, which we’ve defined to be a linear frequency modulated (LFM)
chirp signal (seen below). [8]
Figure 2.2: LFM Signal
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2.2.2 Data Modulation
In order to embed communications on the existing LFM chirp a binary phase shift keying
(BPSK) modulation scheme was explored and subsequently rejected after observing the
negative effect on the radar performance using the ambiguity function (Figure 2.3(b)). [8]
(a) Unmodulated LFM Signal (b) BPSK Modulated Signal (c) RBPSK Modulated Signal
Figure 2.3: Ambiguity Functions Comparison
To solve this issue a reduced binary phase shift keying (RBPSK) modulation scheme was
implemented, which uses a smaller, ±15◦, and as we can see from the ambiguity function
plots below Figure 2.3(c) much more closely matches Figure 2.3(a). Normally this would
not be a feasible solution as the reduced phase increases the likelihood of error due to
noise, however due to the fact that the embedded signal will only need to reach the target
receiver and not return back to the radar it will benefit from a high signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) making this less of an issue. [8]
Figure 2.4: RPSK Constellation
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2.2.3 Variable Phase/Symbol Duration
However, by modulating data onto the radar waveform we have introduced new cyclosta-
tionary features which need to be eliminated, and this is accomplished by using variable
symbol duration reduced binary phase shift keying (VSDRBPSK). By varying the symbol
durations though we have now caused a variation in energy (Eb) from symbol to symbol,
wherein symbols with a longer duration have a higher energy and symbols with a shorter
duration have a lower energy. Fortunately this is simply solved by varying the symbol




Figure 2.5: VSDRBPSK with Phase Offsets
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2.2.4 Design Summary
With that we have an LPD communication waveform embedded within an existing LFM
radar chirp. Below we can see the block diagram for how the transmitter would operate
and the equation for the output signal s(t).




pi(t) · Accos(2πf0t+ 2π
k
2




From the outlined design we can see that in order for this system to function the transmitter
has a psuedo-random phase generator which is used to modulate the data onto the LFM
carrier. If the transmitter generates a pseudo-random sequence of numbers this would allow
for the modulation of the signal, but then the receiver would have to also know the entire
sequence in order to demodulate this data. To prevent this we propose the use of a chaotic
sequence generator at both the transmitter and receiver. Here we will describe chaos and
chaos-based communication systems.[9]
3.1 Chaos Theory
Chaos theory focuses on the study of nonlinear dynamical systems. A nonlinear system is
one in which there is either a multiplying effect or feedback into the system. Dynamical
means that the current state of the system affects the future state of the system. The father of
chaos theory, Edward Lorenz, describes chaos as ”when the present determines the future,
but the approximate present does not approximately determine the future.” [10]
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3.1.1 Chaotic systems
Chaotic systems exhibit a number of desirable traits which are useful when considering
security. First is the sensitivity to initial conditions, or what is also known as the butterfly
effect. As we can see in Figure 3.1 below we have a chaotic system with the same growth
rate and a very small difference in initial condition. Over the first half of the plot the values
are very close to each other, however as time progresses, the slight deviation causes the
systems to diverge. From a communications security standpoint this is desirable as even a
slight error in the initial conditions would not allow an adversary access to your data. [10]
Figure 3.1: Butterfly Effect - Sensitivity to initial conditions
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Another desirable trait that chaotic systems exhibit is that they are deterministic. Be-
cause of this, once an appropriate chaotic system is found, if the rate and initial value are
known, the sequences are reproducible. For our purposes in creating a phase sequence for
modulation this is highly desirable. Rather than having the receiver know the entire se-
quence of phases that were generated at the transmitter, the receiver only has to know the
system, rate and initial value and it can generate it’s own sequence locally for demodula-
tion. Further because of the sensitivity to initial conditions this also makes it easy for the
transmitter and receiver to change the scheme. [9]
Should an adversary somehow figure out how to demodulate the data, one could simply
alter the initial conditions slightly which would create an entirely new phase sequence,
which is much easier than transmitting an entirely new phase sequence to the receiver each
time a change is made. Further, when comparing the chaotic generators to pseudo-noise
sequences such as M-sequences and Gold sequences, the chaotic sequence is aperiodic.
While there are only a limited number of Gold sequences and M-sequences, there are vir-
tually an unlimited number of chaos sequences due to the varying equations, rates, and
initial conditions. [11][10]
N M-Sequence Gold Chaos
7 2 9 9
15 2 17 17
31 6 33 33
63 6 65 65
127 18 129 129
255 16 257 257
511 48 513 513
Table 3.1: Number of sequences of length N
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3.1.2 Chaos-based Communication Systems
While our proposed method seems to be the first attempt to use a chaotic sequence to phase
map, there are other communications which have used chaotic systems to great effect. One
such method utilizing chaotic systems performs modulation by chaos shift keying. As seen
in Figure 3.2 below there are two chaotic generators. The bit modulated determines which
chaotic generator output is used. At the output, the receiver replicates the chaotic signals
to determine the threshold and demodulate the data. [12]
Figure 3.2: Chaos Shift Keying
Another method which uses chaotic sequences uses the output of a chaotic generator to
frequency map an output. This utilizes the spread spectrum/frequency hopping idea but
uses the chaotic generator to determine the hopping of the signal. Our proposed method
will use the output of the chaotic generator similarly but will use it to map a phase offset
versus a frequency. [13]
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3.2 Autocorrelation
Next we look at the autocorrelation function which is used for alignment in time. In per-
forming the synchronization we will be using the autocorrelation function to find the delay
in the received signal. The delay is found by maximizing the output of the autocorrelation
function at various lags. The definition of the autocorrelation function is as follows [14]:
R(s, t) =
E[(Xt − µt)(Xs − µs)]
σtσs
(3.1)
Where X is a random process, t and s are the times, µ is the mean, and σ2 is the
variance, the above equation defines the autocorrelation between the times s and t.
When used without normalization in signal processing, the autocorrelation of a function
f(t) with itself at a given lag τ is as follows [14]:




Where f is the complex conjugate, g−1 is a function which manipulates the function f
as defines g−1(f)(u) = f(−u) and ∗ represents convolution.
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In order to aid this function pilot sequences are often sent out for synchronization pur-
poses. Specifically we use pilot sequences which have a low autocorrelation when there
is any delay in order to aid the autocorrelation function in properly achieving synchro-
nization. Barker sequences are a special set of sequences which have ideal autocorrelation
properties, as seen below. [15][16]
(a) Barker-7 Code (b) Barker-7 Autocorrelation
Figure 3.3: Barker-7 Sequence
With this information we can implement a Barker sequence assisted autocorrelation
function to detect the delay of an incoming signal.
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3.2.1 Autocorrelation of Chaotic Sequence
Another desirable trait that chaotic sequences have is there is a low autocorrelation when
there is any lag. This helps with synchronization and security as slight offsets would yield
an incorrect demodulation of the transmitted data.
Figure 3.4: Chaotic Sequences - Autocorrelation
Next we will move on to the implementation of the proposed changes.
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Implementation
As described in the previous chapter, chaotic sequences have been used in other forms of
digital communication, but to our knowledge, chaotic sequences have not been used to
generate a phase offset to perform phase modulation. This novel approach will eliminate
the need for a transmitter and receiver to have knowledge of an entire pseudo-random
sequence and instead simply know the chaotic sequence generator and initial seed in order
to be able to communicate.
4.1 Transmitter
4.1.1 Chaotic Sequence Generation
The first step to implementing the proposed changes was to add the chaotic generator to the
transmitter side. If we refer back to Figure 2.6 we can see where the pseudo-random phase
generator is. In order to implement our proposed self-synchronization scheme this block
must be changed for a chaotic sequence generator.
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For our design we implemented the following chaotic sequence, called the logistic
map, to generate our phases:
xn+1 = rxn(1− xn) (4.1)
Using this equation for the logistic map we are able to generate chaotic sequences by vary-
ing both the r value such that:
3.57 < r < 4
0 < x1 < 1
This sequence was chosen for it simplicity and the large number of possible seeds which
could be used. This sequence was also ideally bounded between 0 and 1. Other chaotic
sequence generators could be used as well though in this place, the mapping that follows
however may vary slightly.
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Once each of these was set we were able to generate a chaotic sequence, shown below
with r = 3.95 and x1 = 0.8.
Figure 4.1: Chaotic Sequence Generated
4.1.2 Phase Mapping
Once the sequence was generated it was converted into a phase map using the following
equation, where φ is the phase offset, φmin is the minimum phase offset (5 in our example),
φmax is the maximum phase offset (15 in our example), and xi:
φi = φmin + (φmax − φmin)xi (4.2)
This phase mapping equation works given that the chaotic sequence generated is between
0 and 1. If this is not the case then the chaotic sequence would need to be normalized to
meet these criteria then can be used in the above equation.
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From that equation our generated phase map is as follows:
Figure 4.2: Chaotic Sequence to Phases
We can see that the generated chaos sequence has now been scaled to match the desired
phase offsets we will be using in our VSDRBPSK modulation of the data.
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4.1.3 Variable Duration
The next step is to compensate for the change in symbol energy due to the varying phases
by also varying the symbol duration. By rearranging Equation 2.7 we get the following





Using this time scaling factor on the phase mapped sequence produces the following:
Figure 4.3: Chaotic Sequence Phase and Time Adjusted
We can now see how the higher phase offsets have a shorter duration and the lower phase
offsets have a longer duration.
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4.1.4 Pilot Sequence
Now that the phase offsets have been created with the appropriate duration factors that
portion is ready to multiply with our data, however we must first add in our pilot bits.
Below is a table of the barker sequences available:[16]
N Barker Code
2 + -, + +
3 + + -
4 + - + + , + - - -
5 + + + - +
7 + + + - - + -
11 + + + - - - + - - + -
13 + + + + + - - + + - + - +
For the example cases we will use a Barker Code of N = 13.
Figure 4.4: Barker Signal Pilot
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Once this has been done we can append the desired data bits or generate any addi-
tional binary data, multiply the binary string with the phase offset and time adjusted chaos
sequence, and then modulate the LFM chirp.
Figure 4.5: Chaotic Sequence Phase and Time Adjusted with Bit Data
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The final output from the transmitter is as seen below: In the above diagram the fre-
Figure 4.6: Transmitted Signal
quency was intentionally set low, and the phase shifts set relatively high, so that the mod-
ulation would be easily recognizable. This was done for visualization purposes only; in
reality this could be implemented with a much higher frequency and much smaller offsets
depending on the system parameters and the environment.
25
4.2 Receiver
4.2.1 Chaotic Sequence Generation
The next step is to implement the changes proposed in the receiver. First we will implement
the chaotic sequence generator at the receiver, which is simply done by using the same
equation, r value, and initial seed.
4.2.2 Compensating for Delay
The next step is accounting for any delay in the received signal. Once again, because we
are enjoying a relatively high SNR this can be done by simply correlating the unmodulated
LFM chirp with the received signal. Once the SNR is low enough that it has difficulty
locating the delay, then due to the minimal phase shift in the VSDRBPSK modulation, the
data will be unusable, but still, in order to aid in the detection we utilize the barker signal to
modulate LFM waveform and then use that signal to find the delay using autocorrelation.
Figure 4.7: Pilot Modulated Signal
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As we can see in the figure below the pilot sequence makes little difference.
Figure 4.8: Cross Correlation with and without Barker Sequence
Once the delay has been compensated for we then move to demodulating the signal.
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4.2.3 Demodulation
Next we begin working on the demodulation of the signal. One interesting property of the
RPSK signal is that when we project the data onto each axis, only the quadrature component
contains the data being transmitted. Knowing this we can demodulate the data using only
the quadrature component.[17]
Figure 4.9: Projection of data onto component axes
With this knowledge we can create a matched filter receiver for the signal. A block diagram
can be seen here: [17]
Figure 4.10: Block Diagram for Demodulation
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In this equation x′(t) is a π/2 shifted signal which can be described by:







Figure 4.11: Signal with Reference
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Then a hard decision is made:
b̂i =

1, if ri > 0
−1, otherwise
(4.6)
Figure 4.12: Signal Multiplied by Reference Sine Chirp and Inverted
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4.2.4 BER Calculation
To calculate the BER for the VSDRBPSK signal we can use a BPSK BER equation as a















Where A = sqrt(Eb), σ2 = N0/2 is the PSD of the AWGN, Eb is the bit energy, and Q(x)




























By looking at this equation we can see that when φ = 90o, where this is the same as BPSK,
the sin2 component goes away and it is equal to the BPSK BER. As the phase is reduced
this lowers the value of the term inside the radical, dropping the value passed to the Q
function, which increases the BER. [17]
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By passing in the various reduced phases and plotting the BER curves we can see a
full BER plot for various phase angles and confirm that as the phase angle is reduced the
BER increases, mathching our theoretical.
Figure 4.13: BER for BPSK vs Varied Reduced Phases
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4.3 Software Defined Radio Implementation
One the coding was completed and tested via Matlab was to implement the change on the
Software Defined Radio (SDR) that was used with the previous projects.
4.3.1 SDR Environment
The test setup utilizes two Ettus Research USRP X300 High Performance SDRs. The
USRP X300 utilizes a Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA for digital signal processing. For our pur-
poses we utilized the high speed Gigabit ethernet interfaces. The hardware architecture
provides compatible with the GNU Radio and C++/Python APIs which we use in our test-
ing.
Figure 4.14: USRP X300
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Each USRP X300 in our setup has two wideband RF daugherboard slots which allow for
up to 160 MHz bandwidth each and can go from DC to 6GHz.
Figure 4.15: USRP X300 Internals without daughterboards
The configuration used in our testing consisted of two WBX-120 daugherboards in each
USRP X300. These are full-duplex wideband transceivers which cover freqeuncies from
50 MHz to 2.2 GHz with a 120 MHz bandwidth.
Each USRP X300 was attached to a Linux workstation which utilized GNU Radio to con-
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Figure 4.16: WBX-120 Daugherboard
trol the hardware via the high speed ethernet interface. The SDRs were located approxi-
mately 3 ft apart.
Figure 4.17: USRP X300 Setup
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4.3.2 SDR Control
Figure 4.18: SDR Transmit Block Diagram
Above we can see a screenshot from the GNU Radio companion showing the block
diagram for the transmit side of the SDR setup. The transmission file source is generated
via a Matlab script which generates the components of the signal to be transmitted. This is
similarly modified as the code above to change the random phase generation to a chaotic
phase generator. Because of this the bit durations no longer have to be transmitted. Figure
4.19 below is a plot of the transmit signal output for a VSDRBPSK modulated signal with
random phase. As the plots typically show the instantaneous received frequency, the aver-
aging function was enabled allowing us to see the sweep from 20 kHz to 50 kHz.
For our test case we performed a linear chirp from 20 kHz to 50 kHz with a sweep duration
of 2 seconds and a 1 second delay between chirps. The software defined radios were set to
utilize a center frequency of 430 MHz at both the transmit and receive side.
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Figure 4.19: SDR Transmission Plots - Random Phase
Figure 4.20 below shows a VSDRBPSK modulated signal with chaotic phase genera-
tion.
Figure 4.20: SDR Transmission Plots - Chaotic Phase
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Next we look at the receiver block diagram:
Figure 4.21: SDR Receive Block Diagram
Here we see the data is received and saved to a file where it can be demodulated by our
Matlab script. Because we no longer receive the bit durations some additional changes had
to be made to the demodulation code in order to be able to get this working properly, but
overall the process was similar to what was discussed in the previous chapters.
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The following plot shows the SDR received signal with the random phase generation:
Figure 4.22: SDR Receive Plots - Random Phase
Next, we have the following plot showing the SDR received signal with the chaotic phase
generation:
Figure 4.23: SDR Receive Plots - Chaotic Phase
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Prior to examining the new data lets first look at the plots from a BPSK modulated
signal so we have a point of reference. First lets look at what is transmitted for a BPSK
modulated signal. All signals will be transmitted similarly, just changing the modulation
scheme.
Figure 4.24: BPSK Modulated Chirps
Because of the high frequency it is difficult to see the waveform. In order to get a better
view we will next look at a spectrogram so that we can see the frequency sweep.
Figure 4.25: Spectrogram - BPSK
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Figure 4.26: 3D SCF Plot - BPSK
First an overall look at the 3D SCF Plot. To identify features we will look along the
alpha domain to identify the frequency of the modulation. This shows the features we hope
to eliminate using our LPD waveform, to make the features more obvious we use a loga-
rithmic plot and we can see the peaks corresponding with multiples of the symbol rate of
10 kHz.
(a) Linear (b) Logarithmic
Figure 4.27: SCF Plot on α - BPSK
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Once we completed the implementation we began looking at the SCF of the received
signal and comparing the results versus the original randomly generated phase SCF. First
we’ll look at the 3D SCF plot.
Figure 4.28: 3D SCF Plot - Random Phase
Figure 4.29: 3D SCF Plot - Chaotic Phase
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Next we’ll look at the SCF along the cyclic frequency axis to try and identify any
cyclostationary features.
Figure 4.30: SCF Plot on α - Random Phase
Figure 4.31: SCF Plot on α - Chaotic Phase
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In order to more closely look at these two we will look at this plot again on a log scale
for the magnitude.
Figure 4.32: SCF Log Plot on α - Random Phase
Figure 4.33: SCF Log Plot on α - Chaotic Phase
44
Finally we will look at the magnitude plot of frequency versus the cyclic frequency.
Figure 4.34: SCF Frequency Vs α - Random Phase
captionSCF Frequency Vs α - Chaotic Phase
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Conclusion
Overall this method of synchronization provides many benefits:
• Chaotic sequences are more random providing extra security
• Chaotic generator eliminates need for entire length of pseudo-random sequence to be
known, just a seed
• Can easily change the seed value if sequence is compromised
• Maintains LPD Characteristics
5.0.1 Further Research
In the course of this project a logistic map was decided due to its simplicity and the fact
that it was bounded. One topic of further research would be to investigate the merits of
using other chaotic sequence generators. Other sequence generators could be unbounded
and may require additional work.
Additionally, the distribution of the chaotic sequence was found to be not uniform and
could be another factor to consider when investigating alternative chaotic sequences. A
uniformly distributed chaotic sequence would be ideal for efficient use of the spectrum and
to reduce the probability of detection by cyclostationary analysis. A comparison of the
probability density functions below.
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Figure 5.1: Probability density function - Random Sequence
Figure 5.2: Probability density function - Chaotic Sequence
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